

7TH (S) BN. "THE QUEEN'S" REGT.

1917.

Aug.	<u>CHATEAU SEGARD DICKENBUSCH NEW CAMP.</u>	<u>Appendix.</u>
1st.	Bn moves to DICKENBUSCH Area, completing move into Camp by 8.30 p.m.	Ref. Map. Special Composite & HOOGE 1/10,000.
2nd.	Devoted to cleaning up & rifle inspections.	
3rd.	Draft of 1 Officer (2/Lt. M. SHULEHAM-LEGH) and 38 O.R. received.	
	<u>CHATEAU SEGARD. MAP BELGIUM 28 N.W. EDN 6 A. 1/20,000 N.30.D.CENTRAL.</u>	
4th.	Bn. moves to CHATEAU SEGARD Area No.3, moving off at 5.30 p.m. Move completed by 7 p.m. Raining heavily. 2/Lt. G.D.G. BOTTOMLEY to Hospital.	
5th.	Voluntary Service for Non-Conformists & Presbyterians. C.O. holds Conference at BN. H.Q.	
6th.	2/LT. W.R. COHEN returns from leave in England.	
7th.	Operation Order for attack issued. At 7 p.m. Bn. moved into line to relieve 7th R.W. KENTS. "A" & "D" Coys assaulting Companies. "B" Co. Support & Mopping Up. "C" Co to Strong Points & Mopping Up.	
8th.	"A" & "D" Cos go into GRAB CRAWL in early hours of morning. Bn. H.Q. at J.19.b.45.95.	
9.30 p.m.	Heavy enemy barrage for 30 minutes while our advance were getting into position.	
	Attack postponed till the 10th.	Appendix "Q" Para 3.
9th.	All Officers & several N.C.Os reconnoitre route to be taken, & objective.	
12 mid-night	1 N.C.O. per platoon put out on the tapes as left markers. 11th ROYAL FUSILIERS on left flank.	
10th. 12.45 a.m.	Leading platoons reach tapes & enemy being alarmed send up green lights which bring down heavy barrage. 2.28 a.m. another barrage opens by enemy guns.	

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Appendix.

10th. 4.35 Assault launched accompanied by Map. Belgium.
 contd. a.m. an excellent barrage. Ground Sheet 28.N.W.
 difficult with numerous 1/20,000 Sq.
 obstructions including loose H.33.a.8.3.
 wire & tree trunks. Enemy very
 numerous in INVERNESS COPSE
 causing many casualties by
 rifle & M/G. fire. All Officers Appendix "Q"
 with the exception of Capt. Page 4.
 T.C. FILBY & 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON Para.2.
 become casualties. TOTAL
 CASUALTIES. 10 Off. 272 O.R.
 8 p.m. Message received notifying
 relief by 10th ESSEX REGT. This
 was duly effected by early
 morning.

11th. After being relieved Bn moves to
 DICKBUSCH NEW CAMP, where
 troops bathe in improvised open
 air baths, & are issued with new
 clothes.

ABBELE AREA.

5.30 Bn. moves by march route & train Map. Sheet
 p.m. to ABBELE Area, where billets 27 Sq.L.25.
 are occupied at 8.30 p.m.

12th. Troops occupied cleaning up. Edn 6 A.
 2/Lt. E.J.G. WEBB & 2/Lt. Belgium &
 J.M. WILSON to Hospital. France.
 1/40,000.

13th. Inspection of rifles & kits of
 all men of the Bn. Physical
 Drill & Rapid Marching carried
 out. Draft of 4 O.R. received.

14th. Draft of 4 Officers received
 (2/Lts. J.G.S. MORRISON,
 A.L. HAIG, H.W. HEWETT, A.C.W.
 UPTON).
 No. 2196 C.Q.M.S. WEBB F.W. &
 No. 1595 1/CPL. W.M. MARCHANT
 awarded MILITARY MEDAL.

ERINGHEM. MAP SHEET 27. 1/40,000
SQUARE A.

15th. Bn. moves to ERINGHEM Area moving
 by train to ESQUELEBOQ, thence by
 march route, occupying billets
 from 3 p.m. to 3-40 p.m. according
 to situation.

16th. Capt. A.S. WATSON & 2/Lt. G.E.
 STEP arrive from 18th DIV.
 Reinforcement Camp with draft of

- 4 P.M. A relief party of 6 sappers was sent up to carry on work of clearing JASPER LANE.
- 5.30 P.M.
Appendix A
16. I sent 2/Lt. FORD my Intelligence Officer with orders re holding the line night 10/11th. Whilst doing this he was severely wounded & is still missing.
- 6 P.M. Lt. PATERSON, R.E. left H.Q. to see how clearing of JASPER LANE was proceeding & was killed there by enemy shell. The accuracy with which the enemy shelled JASPER LANE & JASPER AV. was one of the marked features of the operation.
- 7.30 P.M.
Appendix "A".
17. A party of 1 Sergt., 1 Corpl. & 18 men was sent to occupy houses at J.14.c.20. I heard later that they failed to find them.
- 8.0 P.M. News was received that the 10th ESSEX were relieving us & no further operations were attempted for fear of complicating the relief & bringing down the enemy's defensive barrage on the troops coming up. My Casualties in the Operation were Officers 10. O.R. 272. Only 10 Officers were available to go with assaulting troops & most of the casualties amongst them occurred close to our lines. Two Hd. Qr. officers were wounded.

APPENDIX "A".

Copies of Orders issued 10th August,
1917.

1. To O.C. "B" Co COLONY.
Advance with your company at once, taking with you all stragglers and occupy line 100 yards inside INVERNESS COPSE i.e. 100 yards EAST of West Edge.
TIME. 5.16 a.m.
3. To O.C. "C" Co COKE.
All men in your trench must be sent forward. The left of attack has gone right forward. Lead them personally if no other Officer available and make good "Strong Point" 1 - J.14.c.75.35.
TIME. 5.45 a.m.
2. To O.C. "C" Co. COKE.
Send forward to find if your No. A Strong Point is in position and report immediately.
TIME. 5.33 a.m.
4. To O.C. "B" Co COLONY.
Await further orders in your present position.
TIME. 6.9 a.m.

5. To O.C. "B" Co. COLONY.
Report to me personally at Bn. H.Q. at once.
TIME. 6.15 a.m.
6. To O.C. "B" Co COKE.
Dig in along line you are on. Collect all stragglers and report how many men you have and what situation is on your front aaa. Do you consider any of battalion are in INVERNESS COPSE.
TIME. 8.20 a.m.
7. To O.C. "B" Co. COLONY.
Have you any word of the platoon detailed to assault Strong Point "A" J.14.e.20?
TIME. 8.22 a.m.
8. To Major Bushell.
I consider it now necessary to send a company forward to our old front line as we are now only 40 rifles in it. Haggards advance on left has failed, held up by M/G. fire. Haggard wounded. No word yet from platoons assaulting on right. Filby collecting stragglers & digging in on line GREEN JACKET DRIVE J.13.d.90.10 to J.13.d.90.30. Last reported strength 20 men. He is only Company officer from whom I can get word with exception of those wounded who include 3 Company Commanders. Please repeat to Bde & give news if possible of attack on our left.
TIME. 8.40 a.m.
9. To 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON.
Hang on to your position which I make to be about J.14.e.35. Am sending sappers to open up JASPER LANE behind you and am getting a line consolidated along GREEN JACKET DRIVE. We have a post in JASPER AVENUE about J.14.e.10 which we are trying to advance, and eventually will link it up with you by pushing out from you to SOUTH and from them to NORTH.
TIME. 10.25 a.m.
10. To O.C. "B" Co COKE.
1 Co. 54th Bde attacking to get line between JASPER LANE and JASPER Av. about 100 yds W of Copse. All COKE to support advance of Co. of CHORUS and dig in on most advanced line secured W of COPSE. Barrage 12 noon on W. edge of COPSE.
TIME. 11.30 a.m.
11. To Capt. BELL-IRVING.
Barrage 12 noon on W. edge of INVERNESS COPSE to allow new line to be taken up. No action required from your Co except that you must get touch on your left flank with our post in JASPER LANE and let me know when you have established this. Also with Captain FILEY on line of GREEN JACKET DRIVE or E of that after Zero.
TIME 11.34 a.m.
12. To COUSIN.
There was no barrage at noon.
TIME. 12.30 p.m.
13. To O.C. "B" Co. COLONY.
(1) You will assault and capture with your Co. enemy post in JASPER AV. J.14.e.25.10.

- (2) 1 STOKES Mortar will co-operate firing rapid from Zero to + 2 minutes.
- (3) The hour of Zero will be notified later after arrangements with T.M.B.
- (4) Success of future operations depends on this being carried out. P.S. Zero 2.45 p.m.
TIME. 1 p.m.

14. To Captain BELL-IRVING O.C. "C" Co COLONY.
Any reinforcements called for from you by O.C. "B" Co COLONY to be supplied by you without further orders.
TIME. 1.25 p.m.

15. To COUSIN.
Operation failed with heavy casualties reported in the COLONY Company.
TIME. 3.30 p.m.

16. To Os.C. "B" & "C" Coys COLONY O.C. "B" Coy COKE & 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON.
I am sending 2/Lt. FORD up to explain my orders.

O.C. "B" Coy COLONY.

To hold our Right flank from 1st Fusiliers to Railway & posts in JASPER AVENUE (inclusive).

O.C. "C" Coy COLONY.

To hold trench from Railway to our Left flank, getting touch with 11th Fusiliers or Middlesex. To patrol hourly during hours of dark to the post in JASPER LANE and send 1 patrol during night from this post to report at British post J.14.c.68.

Captain FILBY.

To hold present line with 7 or 8 posts, getting touch with JASPER AV. on right & JASPER LANE on left.

2/LT. WILSON.

To hold tight until relieved, making every endeavour to strengthen the position. Also to obtain & send back any information possible about the enemy.

ALL.

Estimate of rifles VICKERS & LEWIS Guns available.
TIME. 5.30 p.m.

17. O.C. "B" Co. COLONY.
Sergt. CONNELL "C" Coy COKE is detailed to occupy the houses immediately S. of JASPER AV. near by your post. You will assist him in the preliminary reconnaissance and get touch with him in the houses immediately after he has occupied them.
TIME. 7.30 p.m.

Statement by
2/Lt. J.M. WILSON. "A" Coy.
7th Bn. "THE QUEEN'S" Regt.

2/Lt. J.M. WILSON is in Hospital.
My recollection of his statement after the action of

the 10th August 1917 is:-

"I advanced behind the barrage with the left platoons of the left assaulting Company keeping along the N. edge of INVERNESS COPSE, & reaching the final objective for my Company, the enemy trench at J.14.d.3.6 with about 20 men.

During the advance I saw the troops on my left going off in a Northerly direction so that all touch was lost with them.

At about J.14.c.96 I saw Lt. PICKARD of the Support Company leading a party of men in a N.E. direction.

He may have been trying to keep touch with the right of the 11th Royal Fusiliers.

On getting to the enemy trench I found I was not in touch on right or left, the enemy holding the trench on both flanks, & shortly after I saw large numbers of the enemy in the trench E of the one I was in. My Lewis Guns were got into action, but there were so many of the enemy that their number did not appear to diminish. They started to work round both flanks & to avoid being cut off I decided to withdraw to where I could get touch with the rest of the Bn on my right.

I proceeded along the N. edge of the Copse, seeing none of our men until near the N.W. Corner where I found L/Cpl. PATON with a party who were taking on the M/G emplacement there.

I joined this party & we cleared the enemy out & secured the M/G.

As the emplacement did not offer defence in the direction of the enemy I took my party to a Post in JASPER LANE about 60 yds W of the COPSE, & was joined there by LIEUT. GALBRAITH 55th M.G.C. with two Vickers Guns that did excellent work in firing on the enemy who later appeared along the W. edge of the COPSE, & along JASPER AVENUE where it enters the COPSE.

I noticed the following features in INVERNESS COPSE:-

- (a) The undergrowth is thick & about 4 ft. high.
- (b) The wood had not been greatly damaged by our bombardment, & the large trees were still standing.
- (c) There were ladders up some of the larger trees.
- (d) There were many trenches in the Copse camouflaged by tying bushes over them.
- (e) I saw enemy standing at what appeared to be a dug-out entrance in the centre of the Copse".

(Signed) CECIL CLARE. Lt.Col.

Cdg 7th Bn. "The Queen's" Regt.

Statement by
No. 845 PTE. F. COPPIN "D" Co.
7th Bn. "The Queens" Regt.

In the attack on 10th August 1917 I was in the left front platoon and advanced when the barrage lifted.

At Zero the barrage was about 100 yds in front of us, & at about 70 yds from tape we came up against a continuous band of loose barbed wire & behind this were several small trenches which looked like consolidated shell holes.

These posts were strongly manned with rifles & Machine Guns.

I had great difficulty in getting through the wire. These points had escaped our barrage fire as they were so close to our own position.

(Signed) F. COPPIN.

17/8/17.

Statement by
No. 3554 PTE. ROBERTS A. "D" Coy.
7th Bn. "The Queen's" Regt.

In the attack on INVERNESS COPSE on 10th August 1917 I advanced with the left of the leading line, & about 70 yds from the jumping off tape came across loose wire which I had great difficulty in getting through.

There seemed to me to be no gaps in the wire.

Behind it were a number of strong points made out of shell holes & containing some of the enemy armed with rifles & Machine Guns & bombs.

(Signed) A. ROBERTS.

17/8/17.

Statement by
No. 1100 Sergt. HEWETT A. "C" Co.
7th Bn. "The Queen's" Regt.

During the attack on 10/8/17 I went through INVERNESS COPSE near the S.W. Corner & had to withdraw to a point about 30 yds S. of the wood.

On my way back the enemy coming through the wood from the N. to S.W. Corner & filing along the front of the wood suffered very heavy casualties from a Machine Gun just on my left.

I saw them start to line up & at first as fast as they got into position the M/G knocked them out.

Later more men tried & some of them got into position.

(Signed) A. HEWETT. Sergt.

17/8/17.

Statement by
No. 24568 L/CPL. HUGHES. "C" Co.
7th Bn. "The Queen's" Regt.

I was in charge of a Lewis Gun & Section of "C" Co. (Strong Point Co) & got within 50 yds of the Strong Point we had been detailed to take & hold. We were checked by heavy M/G fire & snipers.

I got my gun to fire on enemy who were standing up in a trench just in front of the wood.

My No. 2 went out in front of my position & fetched a gun which we saw lying there.

We got both guns into action & caused heavy casualties to the enemy, numbers of whom were seen to fall.

(Signed) S. HUGHES. L/C.

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Appendix.

- 30th. Bn. practices "The Attack",
contd. witnessed by Div. Cmdr. "A" Coy
fires on Range in the afternoon.
- 31st. Bn. Scheme carried out. Lewis
Gunnery parade with their Coys
for this scheme.
Draft of 87 O.R. received.

CECIL CLARE. Lt. Col.

Cdg. 7 Bn. The Queens Regt.

APPENDIX "q".

REPORT OF ATTACK ON INVERNESS COPSE
BY 7TH BN. "THE QUEEN'S" REGT. 10TH
AUGUST 1917, & PRELIMINARY
OPERATIONS 7/10TH AUGUST 1917.

- Night 7/8th. Operations started with relief (by "B" &
"C" Coys) of 7th Royal West Kents,
holding the line in J.13.d.
- Taking over
Line. At 10 p.m. 7/8/17, while these Companies
were coming up, there was a heavy enemy
barrage from which relieving Companies
sheltered in CRAB CRAWL, after several
casualties.
Starting from here at about midnight
there was a heavy mist, guides lost
their way, and the relief for which
Companies left CH. SEGARD at 7 p.m.
7/8/17 was only complete at 1.30 p.m.
8/8/17.
The two Assault Companies, ("A" & "D")
went into CRAB CRAWL early morning 8th,
this position being selected as it gave
shelter from shell fire.
- Night 8/9th. At 9.30 p.m. 8th, whilst advance posts
were being put out on our front from
which 7th R.W.K. had withdrawn them by
order, the men moving up were illumined
by lightning, and the enemy in his
advanced posts fired at them, and sent

up green lights, which brought down a heavy barrage lasting half an hour. Posts were later got into position, but it is possible that the withdrawal of our forward posts allowed the enemy to advance his, and there was no time before the assault to clear these out. Arrangements were completed for the assault at dawn on the 9th, when the order postponing it was received; at 11 p.m. at CRAB CRAWL and at 1.15 a.m. at my Headquarters at J.19.b.45.95. The postponement caused some difficulty over rations, those for the 10th arriving too late for issue, so that men did not get the breakfast ration that had been provided, but rum was got round to them.

**Reconnaissance.
8th & 9th.**

During the 8th & 9th all Officers and at least 1 N.C.O. per Platoon reconnoitred the route from CRAB CRAWL to Front Line and the objective of the assault.

**Forming up.
Night 9/10th.**

It was realised that forming up for the two Companies that had to come from CRAB CRAWL might present difficulties and the following steps were taken:-

(1) Route from CRAB CRAWL to Brigade Forward Report Centre J.13.C. 85.00 was flagged and men placed along it with small red lamps at intervals of 150 yds.

(2) From Bde. Forward Report Centre to position of assembly H.Q. runners were stationed as guides.

(3) Two tapes, one for each of the two leading waves were put out parallel to, and slightly E. of GREEN JACKET RIDGE in J.13.d. These tapes joined those of the 11th Royal Fusiliers at J.13.d. 85.55.

(4) My Intelligence Officer with a staff of 3 men was stationed at the S. end of the tapes to guide platoons and warn them to move quietly.

(5) At midnight 9/10th 1 N.C.O. per Platoon was placed on the tapes as a left marker for his Platoon.

The leading Platoon reached the tape at 12.45 a.m. 10th and at 1.10 a.m. rifle shots were heard and the enemy sent up green lights followed by a heavy barrage that extended as far back as GRAB CRAWL. This caught and disorganised the right assaulting Company, and three platoons of the left assaulting Company as they moved across the open in single file.

The moon was bright at the time and the men were probably seen moving into position by the enemy post at J.14.C.21. Officers did excellent work in getting the men started on to the tapes again after the barrage.

At 2.28 a.m. whilst the right of assaulting Company was still moving along the tapes, there was more rifle fire, green lights and another barrage. These barrages had caused many casualties. One platoon which started from CH. SEGARD with a strength of 31 being now reduced to 11.

After the second barrage all men who were not casualties were got into position for assault before Zero, but sections had got mixed and there was no chance to put this right.

Dispositions. Dispositions were:-

Right Assaulting Coy. "D" Company.
Objective - J.14.C.85.10 to J.14.d.17.30.
Left Assaulting Coy. "A" Company.
Objective JAP TRENCH from J.14.d.36 to the South as far as the HOOGE-MENIN Rd. In support to "A" Coy:- Two platoons "B" Company to consolidate a line from J.14.d.17.30 to J.14.d.36. Behind the two support platoons of "B" Company were two "Mopping Up" platoons of which two sections were detailed to clear strong point at N.W. Corner of INVERNESS COPSE, one section to the trench at J.14.d.C.65, one section to the houses at J.14.d.07, and one platoon to entrances of a tunnel under HOOGE-MENIN Rd, if these existed and to take on any dugouts etc. in the line of our advance that they might come across.

Strong Points "C" Coy. 1 Platoon detailed to "Mop Up" JASPER AVENUE up to strong point "A" which they would occupy. 1 Platoon to "Mop Up" JASPER AVENUE from Strong Point "A" to Strong Point 1 at J.14.c.75.35. 1 Platoon to Strong Point 2 at J.14.d.05.35. 1 Platoon to Strong Point 4 at J.14.d.36.

The two latter Platoons were ordered to "Mop Up" anything in their immediate vicinity.

In Reserve in front line "B" Coy. 8th E. SURREYS.

The Assault.
4.35 a.m. 10th.

At 4.35 a.m., Zero, an excellent barrage started, and the assaulting waves advanced to the attack like one man, despite the trying experience of the night.

The ground over which the first stage of the assault had to be made was very difficult for the rear waves who had to get round and over tree trunks and make their way through old barbed wire and camouflage wire netting.

This was particularly the case on the right and caused waves to lose cohesion soon after the start.

I now propose to follow what happened to each Company so far as the information at my disposal allows. A difficulty in regard to this is that I have only one Officer present with the Battalion who took part in the assault, and of my H.Q. the Lewis Gun Officer & Intelligence Officer are also casualties.

**Right Assaulting
 Company.**

On the extreme right, S of the railway, the advancing sections were practically wiped out soon after the start by rifle & M/G fire from the front & right flank, much of the fire coming from the triangle of trenches at J.14.c.21 and the trench running S. from it.

Further to the left all the Officers of the Company were all severely wounded before proceeding far, and the leading Platoons came across loose wire in which the men got entangled, and behind this wire the enemy was occupying a line of shell holes besides enfilading the advance from JASPER AVENUE.

A Sergeant with two or three men got into JASPER AVENUE, and might possibly have cleared the situation by a determined assault along the trench, but the opportunity was missed, and mopping up parties along JASPER AV. were checked.

The enemy meantime was sending reinforcements along the trench running S. from J.14.c.21 and at brought heavy rifle fire at point blank range to bear on the right of our advance.

A party of about 1 section strength of the leading Platoons of the Right Coy. reached the S.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE, but came under heavy fire at close range and all except one became casualties.

At this point there is reported to be a dug-out or tunnel entrance and M/G. emplacement.

Only three or four men of the two leading platoons escaped being killed or wounded, and the two rear platoons

coming under the same fire and suffering heavy casualties took cover in shell holes, later they trickled back to our front line where they were collected and took part in an advance from our left flank to which I refer further on.

**Left Assaulting
Company.**

On the left the assault met with less opposition, but the Company was weak before it started owing to the earlier barrages.

The rear platoons caught up & advanced with the leading platoons and reached the N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE. One Officer, 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON, was ununwounded, and led the two left platoons along the N. edge of the Copse to their final objective at J.14.d.36. Arrived here, he was not in touch with the 11th R.F. whose right had gone off too much to the N. and the right platoons of this Company had not come up on his right as they were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting in the N.W. end of the Copse.

Finding the enemy in great strength moving round his flanks to envelope the party he withdrew them along the N. edge of the Copse, keeping a look out for the right platoons of "A" Company of whom he found a number engaging the enemy emplacement at J.14.e.55.

Joining this party he organised a successful assault of the emplacement, and not considering it suited to defence to the E. he took up a position in JASPER LANE at J.14.e.30.55. where he was joined later by two Vickers Guns (55th M.G.C.).

This party & especially the Vickers Guns did great execution amongst the enemy who later on swept down through INVERNESS COPSE from E. to W.

**Support and
Mopping Up
Company.**

All four platoons of this Company were assembled on the left half of the Bn. frontage as the left had furthest to go, and the right had the support of the right defensive flank Company detailed to the Strong Points.

The Company advanced close behind "A" Coy. and reached the line of the W. edge of INVERNESS COPSE.

The two left platoons went in a N.E. direction from this point with the probable intention of filling the gap between our left & the right of the 11th R.F.

They are believed to have had heavy fighting in JAP TRENCH, but the Officer 2/Lt. PICKARD and his party are missing. The left mopping up platoon had heavy fighting in the N.W. corner of the

Copse and elements of this platoon took part in the assault of the N/G emplacement there and afterwards joined 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON in JASPER LANE. The right mopping up platoon entered the Copse at about J.14.c.53 and have not been heard of since. They were probably overwhelmed by an enemy counter-attack reported to have taken place at about 6.15 a.m. from the direction of HERENTHAGE CHAU. and JAP TRENCH E. of INVERNESS COPSE, the enemy working through the Copse from E. to W. as far as the Western edge.

**Strong Point
Company.**

This Company assembled on the left right half of the Bn. frontage. The platoons for the Strong Points "A" & "1" were to work along H astride of JASPER AV. and in doing so met the same difficulties that had held up the right Company.

The Point "A" platoon lost its platoon Commander and a number of the men, but managed to get a Lewis Gun in action in JASPER AV. about 50 yds W. of Strong Point "A". This gun did excellent work on reinforcements of the enemy coming up to their post at J.14.c.21 and later on the I/CORPL. in Charge found a gun belonging to the right Assaulting Company of which the team had been knocked out, and got both guns in action. The No. 1 Strong Point platoon got held up in the same way as the preceding platoons on the right.

This was the platoon that had been reduced to a strength of 11 by the enemy bombardments before Zero, and after having other casualties 1 N.C.O. of the platoon with the remaining men took up a position in shell holes on the line of GREEN JACKET DRIVE.

Numbers 2 & 3 Strong Point Platoons, led by 2/Lts. SAVORY & R.E. WILSON advanced further on the left and succeeded in entering INVERNESS COPSE but with reduced numbers.

Neither Officer has been heard of since. ~~ner-any-of-th~~ A few of the men who entered the Copse with them were afterwards driven out by the enemy, some joining 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON'S party in JASPER LANE, the others lying in shell holes on the edge of the wood until they could get back at dusk.

**Battalion
H.Q.**

5.15 a.m.

I will now deal with information received and orders issued by me during the battle.

A straggler reported that some men of the right Companies had returned to our front line.

5.16 a.m.
Appendix "A".
1. I ordered Reserve Coy. forward, to take stragglers and occupy a line 100 yds inside INVERNESS COPSE. Also ordered Capt. HAGGARD to collect any men in our front line & report their number.

5.30 a.m. The number was reported as 40.

5.45 a.m.
Appendix "A".
3. Ordered Capt HAGGARD to advance with his party from the left of our frontage & make good Strong Point "1".

6.9 a.m. O.C. Reserve Coy telephoned asking further details regarding the orders sent him to advance. I decided that the opportunity to do this successfully had probably gone and to await news of Captain HAGGARD'S advance.

Appendix "A".
4. Ordered O.C. Reserve Coy. to await further orders.

6.15 a.m.
Appendix "A".
5. Information received that Strong Point "A" not occupied and sent for O.C. Reserve Coy. to explain situation and ordered him to occupy this post. He decided to send a composite platoon of the best men of two of his platoons.

8.15 a.m. Report from O.C. Support Coy. that he had collected stragglers on line of GREEN JACKET DRIVE where he was held up by M/G fire from W edge of INVERNESS COPSE.

8.20 a.m.
Appendix A.
6. Ordered him to dig in, and report numbers & situation.

8.30 a.m. Reported that Capt. HAGGARD'S advance had been held up by M/G fire & that he was severely wounded. From this I concluded that a further frontal attack on the COPSE was not practicable without a barrage.

8.35 a.m. O.C. Reserve Coy. reported that he had only 40 men in hand and forwarded a verbal report that his platoon detailed for Strong Point "A" had been unsuccessful.

8.40 a.m.
Appendix "A".
8. Asked for 1 Coy of the Bde. Reserve to be sent up.

9.25 a.m. Heard from MAJOR BUSHHELL that "C" Coy 8th East Surrey Regt. was being sent up, and also that Lt. GALBRAITH (55th M.G.C.) had seen 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON in JASPER LANE 100 yds E of INVERNESS COPSE, where he had 2 L/Gs and a party of 30 or 40 men.

I ordered 2/Lt. PATERSON R.E. to send a party of 6 sappers to clear JASPER LANE up to this post.

9.30 a.m.

O.C. Reserve Coy. forwarded a report from his Platoon Commander that Strong Point "A" had not been occupied and was held by the enemy.

I sent Lt. HARVEY (T.M.B.) to our line of posts on GREEN JACKET DRIVE to reconnoitre a position from which STOKES Guns could fire on Strong Point "A".

10.25 a.m.
Appendix "A"
9.

Message received from 2/Lt. J.M. WILSON timed 8.25 a.m. and message sent to him explaining situation in ordering him to hang on.

10.30 a.m.

Saw Capt. BELL-IRVING on his way up & explained situation and ordered him to put his Coy in on left of Reserve Coy & N of the railway) and get touch on his left.

11.10 a.m.

B.M.X. 10 received.

Sent for O.C. Reserve Coy & went through this with him arranging that he should assault Strong Point "A" with two platoons over the open at Zero + 2 minutes.

Arranged with Lt. HARVEY (T.M.B.) to co-operate with a STOKES bombardment of two minutes duration on Strong Point "A".

1
11.30 a.m.
Appendix "A"
10.

Ordered Capt. FILEY to advance with all men of the Bn. in support of the assault by 1 Coy 54th Bde mentioned in B.M.X 10 and dig in on most advanced line secured.

11.34 a.m.
~~22-2222~~
Appendix "A"
11.

Sent news of barrage at noon to Capt. BELL-IRVING & ordered him to get in touch with our post in JASPER LANE & with CAPT. FILEY on the line of GREEN JACKET DRIVE or such advanced line as he might secure after the barrage.

12 noon.

There were no signs of the barrage referred to in B.M.X. 10.

12.45 p.m.
Appendix "A"
13 & 14.

Sent for O.C. Reserve Coy to arrange further assault on Strong Point "A" with STOKES barrage only. B.M.X. 12 was shown to Capt. WILLS & Lt. HARVEY & it was arranged to fire a STOKES rapid for two minutes from Zero to Zero + 2 when the Reserve Coy would assault. Zero was fired for 2.45 p.m.

2.45 p.m.
Appendix "A".
15.

Enemy barraged JASPER AV. accurately inflicting heavy casualties on Reserve Coy & breaking up the assault. Report of this was received at 3.25 p.m.

- 4 P.M. A relief party of 6 sappers was sent up to carry on work of clearing JASPER LANE.
- 5.30 P.M.
Appendix A
16. I sent 2/Lt. FORD my Intelligence Officer with orders re holding the line night 10/11th. Whilst doing this he was severely wounded & is still missing.
- 6 P.M. Lt. PATERSON, R.E. left H.Q. to see how clearing of JASPER LANE was proceeding & was killed there by enemy shell. The accuracy with which the enemy shelled JASPER LANE & JASPER AV. was one of the marked features of the operation.
- 7.30 P.M.
Appendix "A".
17. A party of 1 Sergt., 1 Corpl. & 18 men was sent to occupy houses at J.14.c.20. I heard later that they failed to find them.
- 8.0 P.M. News was received that the 10th ESSEX were relieving us & no further operations were attempted for fear of complicating the relief & bringing down the enemy's defensive barrage on the troops coming up. My Casualties in the Operation were Officers 10. O.R. 272. Only 10 Officers were available to go with assaulting troops & most of the casualties amongst them occurred close to our lines. Two Hd. Qr. officers were wounded.

APPENDIX "A".

Copies of Orders issued 10th August,
1917.

1. To O.C. "B" Co COLONY.
Advance with your company at once, taking with you all stragglers and occupy line 100 yards inside INVERNESS COPSE i.e. 100 yards EAST of West Edge.
TIME. 5.16 a.m.
3. To O.C. "C" Co COKE.
All men in your trench must be sent forward. The left of attack has gone right forward. Lead them personally if no other Officer available and make good "Strong Point" 1 - J.14.c.75.35.
TIME. 5.45 a.m.
2. To O.C. "C" Co. COKE.
Send forward to find if your No. A Strong Point is in position and report immediately.
TIME. 5.33 a.m.
4. To O.C. "B" Co COLONY.
Await further orders in your present position.
TIME. 6.9 a.m.