For the Report on the operations on 30th September see Appendix No. 2.

The two Platoons of B Company which were working at the MARTINSART and LANCASTER dumps did not rejoin the Battalion as had been promised. The effect of this was to make the Support Company, B Company, too weak to hold the SOUTH FACE of the Redoubt, and it was necessary to reinforce them with the Reserve Company, B Company. Although at this time B Company was only 60 strong, they would have been invaluable, had they been available to reinforce the NORTHERN FACE of the REDOUTT. The fact that communication with the Brigade was only possible through another Brigade, and later through another Battalion and another Brigade, and later still, not possible at all, added greatly to the difficulties, as important messages re artillery co-operation arrived too late to be acted on. The scheme for the attack did not sufficiently take into account the strength of the East and West faces. Until these were secured any attack from the South face on the Northern face was subject to enfilade fire at close range, but there was no arrangement for barraging either of these two faces. Our Right Assaulting Company dealt with the situation by a very gallant assault on the East Face, in which they killed or wounded upwards of 50 of the enemy and took 46 prisoners, including 3 officers, whilst another 22 prisoners were taken out of one of the dugouts next morning after we had handed over to the 7th Buffs.

As our artillery did not barrage the East Face C Company got very little assistance from our superior artillery in the assault, except that the barrage did prevent enfilade fire on them from the Northern Face.

In the assault C Company lost all their Officers and nearly half their fighting strength. Sergeant Palmer, L/CPL Smith and L/CPL Theodore especially distinguished themselves by rushing a Hun blocking post about 50 yds North of Point 15. L/Cpl Smith had a Lewis Gun with which he did tremendous execution, firing straight down the trench which was full of the enemy.
On the left of C. Company the first 2 waves of A. Company came under very heavy enfilade fire from the West face. Two officers were killed, and, deprived of their leaders, some of the surviving men lay in shell holes in Bo San's Land and crawled back after dark. Those who did get into the North face of the Redoubt have not been heard of since.

The second 2 waves of A. Company swung to the right and filled the gap caused by C. Company attacking the East Face, and the survivors of these two Platoons got into the North face of the Redoubt between Points 27 and 69. They tried unsuccessfully to get touch with their left and they then worked along to the right to about 150 yds West of Point 27 when they found themselves in sufficient numbers to make a block in the trench and to defend it. A. Company did not have more than sufficient time to get into position from the time that they were detailed to relieve D Company as Left Assauluing Company, and with the possible exception of the Company Commander, the Officers and N.C.O.'s had very little idea of the ground and the whereabouts of their objective and the barrage time table.

If an earlier hour had been chosen for the attack more could have been done to exploit the success gained, but as it was the enemy counter barrage lasted until dark. It was a pitch black night, and the ground one mass of deep shell holes, so that messages to and from the front line frequently miscarried, and Officers and N.C.O.'s did not rightly know what forces they had at their disposal.

At 7 p.m. the Brigadier came up to the Battalion Headquarter Dugout and discussed the situation, and about 10 p.m. Lt. Col. Ransome, 7th Suff's arrived and said that he had come to relieve the Battalion. The situation was explained to him and arrangements made for the relief of the Battalion by the 7th Suff's next morning.

A.P.B. IRWIN
Lieut. Col.
WAR DIARY APPENDIX No.1.

NOMINAL ROLL OF N.C.O.'s, and MEN WHO RECEIVED PARCHMENT CERTIFICATES SIGNED BY MAJOR GEN. F.I. MAXSE, CMDG. 18th DIVISION.

2092 Sgt. Bennett, E.
4764 .. Griffin, H.W.
687 .. Cable, R.
4917 .. Willis, F.T.
5162 Cpl. Brown, G.
5295 L/C. Rowe, A.
4773 .. Kerr, J.D.
4741 .. Edwards, G.
5038 .. Kenyon, J.
4879 .. Horton, L.
1666 Pte. Bagg, J.J.R.
5419 .. Sveritt, T.
887 .. Williams, A.
8283 .. Carter, G.
8487 .. Stone, F.
8970 .. Billson, G.
4939 .. Alexander, C.
4793 .. White, J.H.
11312 .. Johnson, P.
8511 .. Daly, H.
6208 .. Knight, A.
2613 .. Carter, W.
6048 .. Osborn, W.H.M.
5009 .. Goulding, T.
4666 .. Jackson, S.J.
4813 .. Neale, W.R.
4859 .. Baradell, E.
5064 .. Kason, C.H.
6202 .. Dimmack, J.W.
4853 .. Dumpleton, M.
5098 .. Smith, N.
5270 .. Meinhart, G.E.
4847 .. Lancaster, J.
5389 .. Austin, E.
5404 .. Catton, S. (Attd. 55th T.M.B.)

REPORT ON THE ATTACK ON THE NORTH FACE OF THE SCHWARZEN REDOUBT ........ SEPTEMBER 30th.

I received orders at 2 p.m. on the 29th Sept. to relieve the 7th Queens in the South Face of SCHWARZEN REDOUBT, and to attack the North Face from there at 4 p.m. 30th.

The right of the Queens in SCHWARZEN REDOUBT was in touch with the Battalion on the right, the Berkshires, at R.20.c.15, but the left at R.19.d.45 was not in touch with the 7th West Kents and was being subjected to hostile bombing attacks up STRASBURG TRENCH from ST PIERRE DIVION.
The South face of the REDOUBT was relieved by midnight by D.Company which I had detailed as Left Assaulting Company, but elements of 7th Queens remained in trench from R.19.d.65 to R.19.d.92 until relieved by us on morning of the 30th.

On advice of O.C. 7th Queens, C.Company which was detailed as right Assaulting Company went into ZOLLERN TRENCH for the night 29th/30th.

B.Company detailed as support Company, was less two Platoons. I understood I should get these back from the Divisional Dumps, on which they were working, in time for the attack, but they were not sent back to me. This Company was also in ZOLLERN TRENCH, and A.Company in Reserve in THIEPVAL.

At about 6 a.m. the enemy put a barrage to the South of SCHWARZEN REDOUBT, and launched a strong bombing attack on our exposed left flank at Pt.45. Our men were attacked from two sides and outranged, especially by the small egg bomb and were driven back, with elements of 7th Queens, about 200 yds. to Pt.92.

Captain Wightman then counter attacked, using flanking parties in the open, and drove the enemy back, establishing a bomb stop at about 40 yards west of Pt.55.

At about 8 a.m. I was in ZOLLERN TRENCH, and received from my Adjutant a copy of a message that had been telephoned from Pt.34 to 55th Brigade by Captain Longburn, 7th Queens, who was commanding details of 7th Queens in trench 65 to 92 (copy attached).

I sent the two Platoons of my Support Company under Captain Thorne via BULGAR TRENCH to the south face of SCHWARZEN with orders to clear it of the enemy, but on arrival they found that Captain Wightman had already done this so far as the bomb stop W. of pt.65. Shortly afterwards Captain Wightman reported that he was being shelled by our guns, in the part of the trench he had retaken, and suffering heavy casualties thereby, although he had indicated his position by flares.

As a result of this shelling, and the enemy bombing attack, his Company's effective strength was reduced to 75 other ranks, and I decided to relieve his Company with the Reserve Company.

This unfortunately did not allow A.Company more than just sufficient time to complete the relief and make their dispositions for the attack.

C.Company, Right Assaulting Company, had previously moved up into position for assault on the Right of D.Company.

B.Company, Support Company, had also got into position in trench 65 to 92, their orders being to garrison the South face of the Redoubt as soon as the Assaulting Companies had left it.

At
At about 11 a.m. Major Clare brought me word from Brigade that the flank attack on trench 39 to 19 allotted to 7th West Kents would not be carried out by them, and that two Companies 7th Buffs would be placed at my disposal.

It being too late to alter my dispositions I decided to substitute two Platoons 7th Buffs for the two Platoons 7th West Kents, and to avoid mixture of Units asked O.C. 7th West Kents to be prepared to relieve the two Platoons 7th Buffs as soon as their objective was gained, so that touch would be gained between us and 7th West Kents at Pt. 39 as soon as possible after the assault.

There was some delay in getting the orders for attack to O.C. D.Coy. 7th Buffs, as he understood his orders to be that he was at the disposal of O.C. 6th Berks, and a difficulty also arose from the fact that his men had not got rations for the day with them.

The two Platoons were in position in Trench 86-95-13, well before ZERO, but I regret that the Officers of the Company had very study the ground and make other dispositions for the assault.

At about Noon I reported that enemy were in trench 45 to 39 in strength and consolidating, and asked that heavy artillery should bombard it from 1.30 p.m. to 1.50 p.m. This did not appear to be done, or if it was done it was insufficient.

Enemy shelling of South Face of Redoubt went on throughout the day, and at 3 p.m. O.C. C.Company reported that two of his Platoons were reduced to 10 and 17 other ranks respectively, and O.C. B.Company had been reported killed.

I ordered O.C. C.Company to send his two strongest Platoons as 1st Wave, and ordered Lieut. Tillard to come up from 1st Reinforcements to command B.Company. He was unable to reach me before ZERO.

At 4 p.m. the barrage started and at the same time the men left the trenches in two waves at about 50 yds. distance,

The attack of the assaulting companies was successful in reaching the North face of the redoubt, but as most of these on the left of the attack were put out by fire from trench 45 to 30 the left of the assault reached objective about 160 yds. E. of Pt. 39.

In the two Companies only one Officer was left unwounded, and other ranks also had heavy casualties.

It was reported that the attack of the two Platoons 7th Buffs had been held up by enemy fire and after being reinforced by two Platoons 7th West Kents had finally failed owing to practically all the men being put out of action.
The position shortly after the assault was that we occupied the North face of the Redoubt from Pt. 27 to Pt. 49 with about 75 men, the E. face from Pt. 27 to pt. 16 with about 25 men and the South face with about 50 men. There was one of my officers near Pt. 27 and one near Pt. 66.

We had cleared the enemy from the East and most of the North face taking prisoners two officers and about 70 other ranks. The enemy put a barrage on the rear face of the Redoubt, and on and about En. Headquarters which lasted for about two hours. I then ordered my Reserve Company, about 60 strong, under Capt. Wightman to reinforce the South Face taking bombs, rifle grenades and C.A.A., and ordered Captain Wightman to reorganise and report situation.

I also sent up Lt. Tillard to assist Capt. Wightman, and both officers carried out my orders quickly and efficiently. Capt. Wightman reported the situation about 9 p.m. to be that they were consolidating Pt. 27 with bombs steps up the three trenches leading from it, and a post about 150 yds. West of it in the North face of the Redoubt.

They were not in touch with the enemy in the North face of the Redoubt, but as the garrison was small and there were only a few bombs left there, it was decided to consolidate the position as it then was. I sent up a Section of the 79th Coy. R.E. to take over the consolidation of point 27. There were two Lewis Guns here, with two Vicker's Guns covering much the same ground from pt. 16.

In consultation with O.C. 7th Buffs it was decided that two Companies, less 2 Platoons, 7th Buffs should relieve the Battalion at dawn, and this relief was carried out.

It was hoped that if the assault on the left were successful the enemy position in the West face of the Redoubt would become untenable. The failure of the assault appears to have been due to its having been enfiladed from the left, owing to the barrage not being sufficiently broad, and from the right by the enemy in trench 68 to 39, who were not touched by the barrage.

I should like to bring to your notice Lieutenant Hibbert, 55th H.G. Coy. who gave me an early and excellent report of the position at Point 27, and Lieut. Corrigan, 7th Buffs who made a most gallant attempt to carry out the assault on the left.

Our casualties were:

- Captain Thorne.
- Captain Paul.
- 2/Lt. Stimson.
- 2/Lt. A.A. Bartram.
- Capt. Rhodes.
- 2/Lt. O. Madox Hueffer.
- 2/Lt. S.M. Mallet.
- 2/Lt. S.G. Barder

KILLED.

- 43 Other Ranks KILLED
- 234 WOUNDED
- 34 MISSING

MISSING
30th.

The position is as follows: Boche driven in stop at Pt. 13.R.D.45. Boche Advanced down trenches to Pt. 65. Boche Driven in Line 65 to 15 Boche Advancing from 15 to 92.

From: Captain Longburn.

Time: 7.20 a.m.

Instructions No. 1.

1. On 1st September at an hour to be notified later 55 Inf. Bde will attack and capture the enemy's positions on the Southern portion of the 18th Div. front & from a defensive flank facing north - The 140 Bde will attack on the right at the same time to capture the village of RANCOURT and make good a final line about DROSEN TRENCH.

2. The Brigade Commander intends to carry out the task allotted him with 2 Battns. and attached troops - 8th E.Surrey R. and 7th Buffs to assault; 7th Queens to be in reserve.

3. Instructions to Troops.

(a) 8th E.Surrey R. will form up on track from S.E. corner of ANDERLU WOOD at B 5 d 0 5 to B 5 a 6 8 - This Pattn. will advance to the assault under a "crab" creeping barrage at zero hour. Barrage will open on the line shown on map and will remain stationary till zero + 5 at which time it will commence to advance at the rate of 100x per 5 minutes. The barrage will not halt till it reaches the protective barrage line (shown on Map). As the barrage does not advance in the same direction as the infantry, officers and M.G.Os. must study the ground carefully and use their compasses.

The 8th E.Surrey R. will advance by bounds. These are shown by Coy areas on the attached map. The principle of leap frog will be carried out throughout.

2 Stokes Portas and 1 section "C" Coy M.G. En. will be placed at the disposal of O.C. 8th E.Surrey R.

The 8th E.Surrey R. will arrive on the line of its final objective at Zero + 205. 2 Pdes of artillery will continue to give it a protective barrage and when this ceased will be available for S.O.S.

The moving out of small bodies of troops to the left flank to command the valleys will require detailed arranging.
(b) **7th Buffs.** At zero hour this bn. will be in
rendezvous at CARHANGER WOOD.
At zero + 2 hrs. this Bn will commence
to advance up the valley through B 12
central and thence, skirting the western
east of RANCOURT in a NNE direction, to
arrive on the line of the E & W grid
U 19 c 00 - U 20 d 00 by zero + 220. At this
time will ensue the barrage shown on the
attached map through U 19 c 0 6 - 20 c 0 6
to U 20 d 6 6 will commence - 2 Coys of
the 7th Buffs will follow in as close as
possible under this barrage which will commence
to move forward in a N. direction at + 240
and at the rate of 100 yards per 4 mins.
These 2 Coys will mop up the shaded area,
will establish observation posts beyond the
crest line in U 13 d and U 14 c & a line
of posts for the all round defence of the
captured area. The remaining 2 Coys of the
Bn. will move forward, by the same route,
into reserve positions about U 19 central.
At the conclusion of the enfilade barrage
there will be a short protective barrage on
the line shown - This will be the S.O.S.line.

(c) **7th Queens** - In reserve to repel a counter
attack or exploit success - The latter task
would probably involve the capture of
SAILLY-SAILLISEL & SALLY.
At zero hour 7th Queens will move from
ANGLE WOOD to ARDERLU WOOD.

(d) **C.Coy M.G. Bn.**
1 section at disposal O C. 8th E. Surrey R.
1 ... 7th Buffs.
1 .. Bde Reserve and will move to
ARDERLU WOOD with 9th Queens.

1 section to move forward with the 2nd Coy
8th E. Surrey R. to establish M.G. nests each of 2 guns
at T 30 b 6 2 and U 25 a 9 8 - directions of fire of
these guns being shown in attached map.

(e) **T.M.E. 54 & 55 T.M.Bs, both under command
of Capt P.O. Heath M.C. will bombard PRIEZ Farm
intensely from zero to zero + 5.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

To: 8th E Surrey Regt.

S.C.110. 4.

The Brigade is being relieved early this
evening by 36th Bde - Units will moves into TROMES
WOOD area - Sent billeting representatives to meet
me at X. roads S.30.a.3.3. at once to choose Transp.
lines - move of Transp will be notified later.

From: 55 Inf.Bde.

Capt